University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Connecticut Law Review

School of Law

2021

The Folly of the Famous Family: Why Matter of L-E- A-’s Definition
of Distinction Does Not Merit Deference
Danielle L. Schmalz Fullam

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review
Part of the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Schmalz Fullam, Danielle L., "The Folly of the Famous Family: Why Matter of L-E- A-’s Definition of
Distinction Does Not Merit Deference" (2021). Connecticut Law Review. 467.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/467

CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 53

MAY 2021

NUMBER 1

Note
The Folly of the Famous Family: Why Matter of
L-E- A-’s Definition of Distinction Does Not Merit
Deference
DANIELLE L. SCHMALZ FULLAM
Attorney General Barr abruptly changed the course of asylum law in the
United States on July 29, 2019, in his decision in Matter of L-E-A-. Barr
declared that usually, family-based, particular social group asylum claims
would fail due to a lack of specific social distinction. Essentially, Barr
decided that in order to constitute a cognizable particular social group, a
family would have to be well-known within the society in question. While
social distinction has been a component of asylum law jurisprudence for
some time, never before was there the requirement of specific social
distinction. Despite making a major change to asylum law, Barr offered little
support for his argument, and the explanation he did provide is grounded in
a misunderstanding and misquoting of case law; his decision is arbitrary
and capricious. While Barr was acting within his authority as Attorney
General and head of the Board of Immigration Appeals when he issued this
decision, he was clearly motivated by a political agenda. This decision is yet
another attack on immigrant families and will negatively impact hundreds
of thousands of claims, especially those of unaccompanied children. In the
interest of justice and the balance of powers, courts should use their power
of judicial review to hold that Barr’s decision does not merit deference
under the second step of the Chevron doctrine.
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The Folly of the Famous Family: Why Matter of L-EA-’s Definition of Distinction Does Not Merit
Deference
DANIELLE L. SCHMALZ FULLAM *
INTRODUCTION
On July 29, 2019, there was a significant and abrupt change in asylum
law. Previously, there had been well-established precedent that the nuclear
family members of a named individual would usually meet all of the
requirements necessary to constitute a particular social group for purposes
of requesting asylum.1 Attorney General Barr’s decision in Matter of
L-E-A- abruptly changed this precedent and attacked the particular social
group of nuclear family members of named individuals due to a lack of
specific social distinction.2
This Note will argue that federal courts should not consider Matter of
L-E-A- a reasonable agency decision, and as such, courts are not required to
defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA” or “the Board”) decision
under the Chevron doctrine. While courts may be tempted to avoid grappling
with the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of L-E-A-, courts should use
their power-balancing authority to voice the fact that the decision is
arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the statute.
I will begin by explaining basic principles of asylum law and the
framework of the BIA’s authority, both of which are essential for
understanding the argument. Next, I will discuss the development of the
particular social group theory, beginning with its domestic origin in 1985. I
will then examine the application of the particular social group theory to
nuclear families and tribal clans throughout the years, leading up to the state
of caselaw at the time of Barr’s decision. Next, I will introduce Matter of
L-E-A-, both the BIA’s decision in 2017 and the Attorney General’s decision
in 2019. This will lead to an exploration of the relevance of the decision and
the impact it has had. Matter of L-E-A- will be examined under both Chevron
steps, revealing that courts should find Barr’s decision to be arbitrary and
capricious. Courts should determine that Matter of L-E-A- does not merit
*

J.D. 2021, University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A. 2017, State University of New York
College at Geneseo. Thank you to Professor Valeria Gomez for sharing her time and expertise as the
faculty supervisor for this research, and to Professor Jon Bauer for his valued feedback. Thank you to the
entire CONN. L. REV. team for their edits. Finally, a warm thank you to my family and friends for their
support and encouragement throughout law school.
1
See discussion infra Section V.C: Nuclear Families.
2
Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (2019).
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deference due to the folly of the famous family: Barr’s incorrect conclusion
that specific families must be socially distinct.
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ASYLUM LAW
Unlike many other areas of law, our modern domestic asylum law results
from our international obligations; Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980
to ensure that domestic law complied with our international obligations
under the 1967 United Nations Protocol.3 The term “refugee” was first
defined at the United Nations Refugee Convention in 1951 (“UN
Convention” or “1951 Convention”) in the aftermath of World War II.4 The
key legal principle was non-refoulement, meaning refugees could not be
forced to return to their countries of origin where their lives were in danger.5
The United Nation’s definition of a refugee is any person who:
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.6
In 1967, the United Nations Refugee Protocol (“UN Protocol” or “1967
Protocol”) extended the definition of a refugee beyond the temporal and
geographical limitations of the 1951 Convention.7 The United States signed
on to the UN Protocol in 1968, officially obligating itself to comply with the
international law concept of non-refoulement.8 After the signing of the UN
Protocol, U.S. asylum policy was still ad hoc, prompting Congress to pass
the Refugee Act in 1980, where the United States formally codified in statute
the UN’s definition of a refugee:9
3

Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987).
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 1, 3 (2011), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/aboutus/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html.
5
The Choices Program, Timeline of Major Refugee and Asylum Laws and Policies, BROWN UNIV.
DEP’T HIST., https://www.choices.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Seeking-Asylum_-TimelineRevised.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).
6
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES 1, 14 (2010), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.
7
Id. at 4. The Holocaust motivated the United Nations to protect populations that were being
persecuted for a fundamental characteristic, such as religion. With the Holocaust in mind, the Convention
initially limited the definition of a refugee as someone who was European and experienced persecution
prior to 1951. Id. at 2.
8
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436–37.
9
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 201, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980);
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1980) [hereinafter INA].
4
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The term “refugee” means any person who is outside any
country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution10 or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.11
The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice
issued implementing regulations, codified mainly in 8 C.F.R. § 208.1, et seq
and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.1, et seq. To meet the Immigration and Nationality Act’s
(“INA”) definition of a refugee, it is generally the asylum applicant’s burden
to prove each element by a preponderance of the evidence.12 The elements
are as follows:

(1)
(2)

10

The applicant must be outside of his or her country of origin and
in the United States or at a U.S. port of entry.13
The persecution must be:
(a)
Harm suffered or feared that is severe enough to rise to
the level of persecution.14
(b)
The government in the country of origin must be unable
or unwilling to protect the individuals from persecution.15
For example, if an individual could have gone to the
police and police action would have mitigated the
situation, this element will likely not be met.
(c)
There must be a well-founded fear of future persecution.
(i)
The Supreme Court held in Cardoza-Fonseca
that even if there were just a one in ten chance
of persecution, the odds of persecution would
constitute a well-founded fear.16
(ii)
If an applicant shows she has already suffered
persecution, it raises a rebuttable presumption of

Note how the United States largely adopted the definition from the United Nations Convention
but added “because of persecution,” which indicates past persecution alone could be the basis for asylum
in the U.S.
11
INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (1980).
12
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (2019).
13
Id. An asylum-seeker in the United States does not include all people outside of their countries
of origin—it only includes people who are inside the United States or at a U.S. port of entry. For the
purposes of this paper, I will be dealing exclusively with the asylum system, so any references to a
“refugee” will refer to asylum-seekers only.
14
Korablina v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998).
15
Navas v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 217 F.3d 646, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2000).
16
Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
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well-founded fear of future persecution.17 If an
applicant proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that she suffered persecution in the past,
the burden shifts to the Government to show that
the fear of future persecution is not well-founded,
due to changed circumstances, for example.18
There must be nexus between the protected ground and
the persecution.19 To establish that an applicant is subject
to persecution on account of one of the five protected
grounds listed above, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the causal connection between the protected
class and the persecution, meaning the well-founded fear
of persecution must be a direct consequence of membership
in a protected class.20 It is the applicant’s burden to prove
this with evidence.21 There could be mixed motives for
persecution, as long as one central reason for the
persecution is a protected ground.22

Additionally, there are mandatory bars to asylum, meaning even if the
above definition of a refugee is met and proved, asylum can be denied.23
These mandatory bars also originate from the UN Convention and its 1967
Protocol.24 An asylum-seeker is ineligible for asylum if she: (1) engaged in
the persecution of others; (2) was convicted of a particularly serious crime
and is considered a danger to the United States; (3) committed a serious
nonpolitical crime outside the United States; (4) poses a threat to the security
of the United States; or (5) has been firmly resettled in another country
before arriving to the United States.25

17

8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (2019).
Id.
19
INA § 101(a)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1980).
20
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)–(2) (2019).
21
Id.
22
8 C.F.R. § 158 (b)(1)(B)(i) (2019).
23
8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (b)(2)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193). Note, there are two forms
of relief from deportation that derive from the Refugee Convention: (1) asylum and (2) withholding of
removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006). Both conform with our most basic international obligations
not to return those who meet the definition of a refugee to their home countries if return would result in
persecution. Asylum goes further than withholding of removal by allowing a pathway to lawful
permanent resident status and eventually naturalization, so asylees must additionally convince
adjudicators that they merit positive exercise of discretion—in other words, that they are deserving of the
rights that come with asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (2019). Withholding of removal provides the
obligatory protection from deportation and a work permit, but no pathway to lawful permanent resident
or citizen status. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006). Withholding of removal is mandatory, not discretionary
like asylum, as required by the 1967 Protocol. For purposes of this Note, however, the particular social group
analysis is the same for asylum and withholding of removal, because both require nexus.
24
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6, at 4.
25
8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (B)(2)(A) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-193).
18
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II. FRAMEWORK OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS’ AUTHORITY
A. The Attorney General’s Regulatory Power
Congress designated the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) as the agencies to administer the
immigration and refugee-processing functions described in the statutes.26
Within the Department of Justice, there is the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and within EOIR, the Board of Immigration
Appeals.27
FIGURE 1 – United States Immigration Agencies28

The BIA’s published decisions have binding effect on immigration
courts and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).29
The attorney general has authority deriving from the INA, which includes
the ability to make determinations and rulings,30 certify cases for his or her
26
Executive Office for Immigration Review: An Agency Guide, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/eoir_an_agency_guide/download. DHS is tasked with
adjudicating claims of asylum-seekers who are not in immigration enforcement (removal) proceedings. DOJ
is tasked with adjudicating claims of people encountered at a port of entry or in removal proceedings.
27
Organization Chart, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Jan. 27, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/organization-chart.
28
Id.
29
Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy
Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 920 (2016).
30
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2018).
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review sua sponte,31 and issue decisions binding on all asylum
adjudicators.32 This power exists regardless of how much time has passed
since a BIA decision or how federal courts have already interpreted and
applied that decision.33
B. Balance of Power Between the Executive & Judicial Branches
Agency determinations are subject to judicial review.34 While federal
courts must usually defer to agency decisions, there are some important
limitations. Judicial review is especially important as a power-checking
mechanism here because the BIA decisions have more of a sweeping effect
on policy than decisions from a court. The Supreme Court explained, “legal
lapses and violations occur, and especially so when they have no
consequence. That is why [courts have for] so long applied a strong
presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.”35
C. Chevron Deference
One concept in the law governing the relationship between
administrative agencies and federal courts is the Chevron doctrine.36 The
doctrine outlines when federal courts must defer to an agency interpretation
of a statute and when courts can overrule an agency’s interpretation.37
Three years after Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly stated in
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca that Chevron applied to the INA’s asylum and
withholding provisions.38 While other statutes and legal concepts address the
relationship between immigration agencies and federal courts, this Note
focuses on the Chevron doctrine because it deals with federal court
deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the Refugee Act’s term, “particular
social group.”

31

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2020).
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(g)–(h)(1)(ii) (2020). Determining whether Congress has delegated
interpretative authority to an agency and whether the agency is utilizing this power are necessary
requirements that are sometimes referred to as Chevron Step Zero because they are prerequisites to
applying Chevron deference. Motion Picture Assoc. of Am., Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir.
2002); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards,
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 813 (2002).
33
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(g)–(h)(1)(ii) (2020).
34
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–
06 (2018).
35
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Servs., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (internal citation omitted).
36
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837–38 (establishing what is now referred to as the Chevron doctrine).
37
Id. at 843.
38
480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987); Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of
Chevron in Refugee Act Cases, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 133 (2019).
32
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D. The Steps of Chevron Analysis
(1) First Step: An agency’s authority to implement and administer
laws must come from Congress, so an integral first step of
Chevron includes determining whether Congress indicated how
a particular term should be interpreted.39 When congressional
intent for statutory interpretation is clear, both courts and
administrative agencies must follow it.40 Courts can disregard
an agency’s interpretation if it is contrary to clear congressional
intent. Courts use a number of canons of construction to
determine congressional intent,41 including a review of the plain
language of the statute, the structure of the statute, and the
legislative history.42 If congressional intent is clear, that is the
end of Chevron analysis.
(2) Second Step: “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue [and an agency has issued a
decision], the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”43
In defining whether an interpretation is permissible, courts
employ an “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute” analysis.44 A court is not bound to an agency’s decision
if it determines, after engaging in the above-described analysis,
that the decision is unreasonable.45 Review of agency action
under the arbitrary and capricious standard can include other
factors besides the reasonableness of an agency decision, such
as reliance interests or whether the departure from prior policy
was adequately explained.46
Even when courts desire to hold differently than the agency did in its
determination, or when a court’s prior decision conflicts with the agency’s
39

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
Id.
41
See, e.g., id. at 863–64 (using context as a tool for determining statutory intent).
42
LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND
RECENT TRENDS 43–45 (2014), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf.
43
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
44
Id. at 844. The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) does not apply to immigration courts.
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306 (1955) (describing various legislative enactments to clarify
congressional intent and the exclusion of removal proceedings from the APA requirements); Catherine
Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 13 (2018).
45
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
46
See Grace v. Barr, No. 19-5013, 2020 WL 4032652, at *18 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (describing part of
the agency’s decision as arbitrary and capricious on the ground that it marked a change in policy without
demonstrating “reasoned decisionmaking”); Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 64 (2011) (holding that the
BIA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was “unmoored from the purposes and concerns
of the immigration laws” and was not supported by relevant considerations); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020) (explaining that the Acting Secretary’s failure
to discuss an important aspect of the problem is reason alone to render the decision concerning DACA
arbitrary and capricious).
40

164

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:1

subsequent determination, courts must engage in Chevron analysis to
determine whether the agency’s interpretation merits deference.47 “If a
statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is
reasonable, Chevron requires a federal court to accept the agency’s
construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading differs from what
the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”48 Thus the bar for a
court deferring to an agency decision is relatively low; the standard is
reasonableness, not necessarily agreement.
Courts are required to engage in Chevron analysis even when an agency
decision contradicts a court’s prior decision. In National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X, the court of appeals did not conduct
a Chevron analysis, concluding that its previous decision on the matter had
established precedent prior to the agency’s decision, and, therefore, it did
not need to defer to the agency’s new decision.49 The Supreme Court held
that this was erroneous, and where Congress has been silent or ambiguous
on a matter, agency decisions have the ability to reverse a court’s precedent
so long as the agency’s determination is reasonable.50 The Supreme Court
clarified, “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”51 The
Court credited Chevron for establishing “a presumption that Congress, when
it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency,
understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the
agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.”52
An agency’s authority to fill statutory gaps exists even when an agency
makes a determination that is inconsistent with its prior determinations.53
“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s
interpretation under the Chevron framework.”54
E. How Courts Have Engaged in Chevron Analysis in Recent Years
In the past few years, certain Justices of the Supreme Court have opined
that federal courts have been too deferential to agencies in their application
of the Chevron doctrine. Justice Kennedy, for example, has lamented the
cursory nature with which circuit courts have applied the Chevron analysis:

47

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
49
Id. at 982.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N. A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)).
53
Id. at 981.
54
Id.
48
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In Urbina v. Holder, [sic] for example, the court stated,
without any further elaboration, that “we agree with the BIA
that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous.” It then
deemed reasonable the BIA’s interpretation of the statute, “for
the reasons the BIA gave in that case.” This analysis suggests
an abdication of the Judiciary’s proper role in interpreting
federal statutes.55
Justice Kennedy further suggested that an appropriate future case could
present a ripe opportunity to reexamine the premises that underlie Chevron
and the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, echoing the concerns
of other members of the Court, specifically Justice Thomas and Justice
Gorsuch.56 Because Justice Kennedy retired shortly after writing this
concurrence57 and these were some of his last words on the bench, some
legal observers placed additional emphasis on his statements and
hypothesized that this was a pressing issue for Justice Kennedy.
Chevron has been critiqued for its difficult and complicated
implementation.58 Experts have also questioned whether it is appropriate to
engage in Chevron deference for immigration cases; perhaps Congress
intended courts to engage in robust review, as opposed to deferring to the
BIA and Attorney General, given the importance of immigration law.59
Chevron remains the law for judicial review of agency statutory
interpretation, however, and courts have a duty to engage in thorough
analysis as a means of preserving the balance of power.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP THEORY
The drafters of the UN Protocol and Convention added the particular
social group (“PSG”) ground after the initial drafting of the other protected
grounds, and intentionally left the PSG ground vaguer than the other
categories, in the hopes of protecting groups that the Convention could not
foresee or identify at the time of the drafting.60 When asylum adjudicators
began implementing the Refugee Act and interpreting the meaning of PSG,
international jurisprudence construing the definition of a PSG was sparse,
55
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Urbina v.
Holder, 745 F.3d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 2014)).
56
Id. at 2121. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, regarding Auer deference,
has further called into question the fate of Chevron deference, but for now, Chevron remains the law. 39
S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
57
Robinson Meyer, Justice Kennedy’s Retirement Could Reshape the Environment, ATLANTIC
(June 27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/kennedys-departure-couldreshape-the-environment/563930/.
58
Sweeney, supra note 38, at 148.
59
Id. at 128.
60
Brienna Bagaric, Revisiting the Definition of Particular Social Group in the Refugee Convention
& Increasing the Refugee Quota as a Means of Ameliorating the International Displaced Person’s Crisis,
69 S.C. L. REV. 121, 151 (2017).
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requiring that U.S. agencies further develop PSG theory in domestic law.61
As the Board has remarked, “[t]he concept is even more elusive because
there is no clear evidence of legislative intent”62 and “[r]ead in its broadest literal
sense, the phrase is almost completely open-ended. Virtually any set including
more than one person could be described as a ‘particular social group.’”63
A. Innate & Immutable Characteristics
In 1985, the Board of Immigration Appeals addressed the meaning of
PSG, for the first time in the landmark case Acosta.64 The Board used a wellestablished doctrine for statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, meaning
“of the same kind.”65 Given that membership in a PSG was listed with the
other four protected grounds for asylum, the doctrine of ejusdem generis
holds that the specific words in question should be interpreted in a manner
that is consistent with the other words in the list.66 The Board reasoned that
the other four protected grounds constituted groups of people with
characteristics that were immutable, meaning the characteristics were so
fundamental to personal identity that they could not change or should not
have to be changed.67 The Board expanded on acceptable shared
characteristics that could form the basis of a PSG: “[t]he shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in
some circumstances . . . a shared past experience such as former military
leadership or land ownership.”68
After Acosta, presenting a PSG claim became a multi-step process.
Once a group is established that consists of members who share
immutable characteristics, the applicant must show that he or she is a
member of that group.69 The applicant must then show that the reason he or
she was being persecuted was because of his or her membership in that
group (the nexus requirement).70
The Board decided that this immutable characteristic analysis should
take place on a case-by-case basis.71 At the time of this decision, issued only
five years after Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, few
asylum-seekers asserted claims on the basis of membership in a particular
61
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985). “Congress did not indicate what it
understood this ground of persecution [PSG] to mean, nor is its meaning clear in the Protocol.” Id.
62
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 230 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing Valdiviezo-Galdamez v.
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 594 (3d Cir. 2011)).
63
Id. (citing Fatin v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993)).
64
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 212.
65
Id. at 233.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (1980).
70
Id.
71
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
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social group.72 The case-by-case approach allowed adjudicators maximum
flexibility in considering the unique aspects of any given case, but it also led
to confusion and inconsistencies, especially as the number of claims based
on a respondent’s membership in a particular social group increased.73
B. Additional Requirements
In 2006, citing inconsistency in immigration court decisions and
requests from federal courts for more clarity, the Board introduced the
elements of social distinction74 and particularity to the definition of a
particular social group.75 Thus, in order to present a cognizable particular
social group, an applicant must propose a group that not only is immutable,
but also socially distinct and particular. In justifying the new requirements,
the Board looked to the Guidelines of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.76 The Board noted that the UN had always
required that particular social groups be socially visible by stating that
“persecutory action toward a group may be a relevant factor in determining
the visibility of a group in a particular society.”77 The Board also reviewed
its previous decisions and determined that, although not expressly using the
term social visibility/distinction, it already required that particular social
groups possess characteristics that were “recognizable by others in the
country in question.”78
Although the BIA did not state particularity as an element in its holding
in In re C-A-, it made a finding of particularity in dicta: “We find that this
group [‘former noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug
cartel’79] is too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particularity.”80
In 2008, the Board definitively held that there were now three
requirements to meet the definition of a particular social group—shared
immutable characteristics, social distinction, and particularity.81 In 2014,
nearly thirty years after Matter of Acosta, the Board of Immigration Appeals
reaffirmed the standards first established in Matter of Acosta and clarified
72

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 231 (B.I.A. 2014).
Id.
74
At the time, the BIA and the United Nations referred to social distinction as “social visibility.”
The Board subsequently changed the term to “social distinction” to emphasize that social distinction does
not necessarily require literal, ocular visibility. Id. at 240.
75
In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006).
76
Id. at 960.
77
Id. (citing to U.N. HIGH COMM’R OF REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION:
“MEMBERSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951
CONVENTION AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, HCR/GIP/02/02
para.14 (2002), https://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION]).
78
Id. at 960.
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Id. at 951.
80
Id. at 957.
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Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582–83 (B.I.A. 2008).
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the amended social distinction and particularity standards in two cases
decided on the same day.82 The Board summarized its prior case law, stating:
[A]n applicant for asylum or withholding of removal seeking
relief based on “membership in a particular social group” must
establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share
a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in
question.83
C. Social Distinction
The social distinction analysis centers on one main question—does the
society in question view the proposed group as a class?84 The perception of
the society in question, and not just the perception of the persecutor, determines
whether a social group is recognized for asylum purposes.85 The Board also
requires that the social distinction requirement is met without circular
reasoning; the group must not be defined solely by the harm it may suffer.86
D. Particularity
“A particular social group must be defined by characteristics that
provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group. . . .
The group must also be discrete and have definable boundaries—it must not
be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”87 Typically adjectives like
“wealthy” and “young” are too broad to pass the particularity test.88 In most
cases, this is because if people from the same country of origin were asked
to define who is “wealthy” and “young,” their answers would vary widely.
E. Social Distinction & Particularity Critiques
For almost twenty years, the immutability standard was the only
defining element that the BIA identified for determining whether a proposed
group was a cognizable particular social group for purposes of asylum. The
requirements of social distinction and particularity have been criticized for
numerous reasons. First, the requirements are somewhat redundant; as the
Board itself has stated, “particularity” is included in the plain language of
82
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
208, 210–11 (B.I.A. 2014).
83
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237.
84
Id. at 240.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 242.
87
Id. at 239.
88
See, e.g., In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008). While some general principles emerge, there is always a case-by-case
analysis that requires evidentiary support. A group that lacks particularity in one case may be found to
be sufficiently particular in another.
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the Act and is, by nature, part of the term “particular social group.”89 Second,
the requirements have been critiqued for being unworkable at times when
applied together. Deborah Anker, an author and the founder and director of
Harvard Law School’s Immigration and Refugee Clinic,90 explained:
Another issue presented by the particularity and social
distinction requirements is the difficulty of simultaneously
meeting both. A category such as “youth” may meet the social
distinction requirement because society recognizes youth as a
distinct group, but fail the particularity requirement because
“youth” has no strict, objective boundaries. If “youth” were
more precisely defined as those aged 12–25, however, then the
grouping may fail the social distinction requirement because
the society may not perceive that specific age range as a
distinct category. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit rejected such a
PSG in Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder.91
Additionally, the fact that a particular social group must be viewed as
socially distinct by society is problematic because persecutors could see a
segment of the population as distinct, despite the lack of recognition from
society as a whole.92 Society as a whole may not recognize a group due to
ignorance or hate, leaving a segment of the population unprotected.
After the announcement of the two new requirements, some courts of
appeals rejected the additional standards; the Seventh and Third Circuits
initially held that the new standards were vague and unjustified.93 These
courts especially pushed back at the Board’s assertion that the requirements
had always been a tacit part of the Board’s analysis and that the groups
recognized as particular social groups in earlier cases would meet the new
particularity and social distinction requirements.94 Other federal courts
deferred to the agency decision or accepted it without analysis.95

89

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239.
Deborah Anker, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10024/Anker (last
visited Aug. 2, 2020).
91
DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 5:43 (2020 ed.) (citing RiveraBarrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 650, 653 (10th Cir. 2012)).
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Id. Refugee law aims to protect an individual from persecution when she enjoys no protection from
her state due to a fundamental breakdown of the relationship between an individual and her state. Whether
society as a whole recognized a group as socially distinct was not originally part of this equation. Id.
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Fatma E. Marouf, The Role of Foreign Authorities in U.S. Asylum Adjudication, 45 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 391, 422–24 (2013); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009); ValdiviezoGaldamez v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604, 616 (3d Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit eventually
adopted the new standards. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 539–40 (3d. Cir. 2018).
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Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615–16; Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604, 616.
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Marouf, supra note 93, at 422–24; see, e.g., Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir.
2010); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 994
(6th Cir. 2009) (illustrating the adoption of the new standards by several circuit courts without robust analysis).
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IV. PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP THEORY APPLIED
A. Tribal Clans
In In re H-, the Board found that tribal clans and subclans could be
cognizable particular social groups.96 The applicant presented a claim based
on his membership in the Darood clan and Marehan subclan of Somalia,
which he showed was targeted by the members of the United Somali
Congress or Hawiye clan.97 The subclan shared ties of kinship and identifiable
linguistic commonalities.98 The “ties of kinship” were an immutable
characteristic and the linguistic differences made the subclan socially
distinct in Somalia.99 Somalis could recognize members of the Marehan
subclan.100 The subclan was also particular, as the kinship ties and linguistic
differences made it clear who was in the subclan and who was not.101
B. Family-Based Particular Social Groups Found Not to Meet the Legal
Standard
At times, family-based particular social groups claims have been
unsuccessful due to the failure to show particularity, social distinction, or a
nexus between the proposed group and the harm. In Matter of S-E-G-, the
asylum-seekers proposed a claim based on two particular social groups: “(1)
Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by MS-13
and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on their own
personal, moral, and religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities;
and (2) family members of such Salvadoran youth.”102 The BIA wrote, “the
‘proposed group of “family members,” which could include fathers, mothers,
siblings, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, grandparents, cousins, and others, is
. . . too amorphous a category.’”103 This particular social group failed the
particularity element. Further, the Board held that the adjective “youth” in
the first proposed group was not immutable, because by nature, age changes,
and one does not stay “young” forever.104 Because the second group was
based on the characteristic of shared kinship ties to the first particular social
group presented, the second group also failed the immutability element.
Notably, the group did not fail on social distinction grounds.
96
See generally In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 338 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that Applicant H’s subclan
constituted a particular social group).
97
Id. at 337, 344.
98
Id. at 343.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581 (B.I.A. 2008).
103
Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 593 (Att’y Gen. 2019) (citing to Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. at 585).
104
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 583.
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C. Nuclear Families
Prior to Matter of L-E-A-, the BIA recognized many particular social
groups based on the shared characteristic of kinship ties because these
groups satisfied the three elements of a particular social group: immutability,
social distinction, and particularity. In Matter of Acosta, the BIA explicitly
listed particular social groups with the shared characteristic of “kinship ties”
as an example of an immutable characteristic that could define a valid
particular social group.105 Groups where members share kinship ties have
been considered a PSG since the Board made an effort to define and clarify
“particular social group” as a term in 1985.106 In re C-A-, the first case in
which the BIA announced the additional requirement of social distinction,
also reaffirmed family relationships as a characteristic that could be the basis
of a PSG.107
While discussing social distinction, the BIA stated that “[s]ocial groups
based on innate characteristics such as . . . family relationship are generally
easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social groups.”108
Prior to Attorney General Barr’s decision in Matter of L-E-A-, families were
considered to be socially distinct in many communities, although social
distinction was evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration
the reference community (i.e., the applicant’s country of origin). For
reference purposes, the United States is an example of a country where
nuclear families are socially distinct. “The United States has family-based
immigration status, family law, and family-size bags of chips. It shapes its
laws, communities, and even schools around the concept of family because
it recognizes that family is a special, socially distinct entity.”109 To gauge
the social distinction of a nuclear family, one would ask whether the society
in the applicant’s home country views the nuclear family as a group. When
it is common practice in a society to use last names as familial associations
and to ask people who look alike if they are related, it is an indication that
the nuclear family is indeed socially distinct.
Whether a family-based particular social group is particular largely
depends on how the applicant frames his or her proposed group. For
example, if an applicant states she belongs to the particular social group
“children of Named Individual,” it would be clear who is in the group and
who is out of the group.
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Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
Id.
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In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006).
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Id.
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Erin Liechty, No Fame Required: Where Matter of L-E-A- Went Wrong, REFLAW (Jan. 29,
2020), http://www.reflaw.org/no-fame-required-where-matter-of-l-e-a-went-wrong/.
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V. THE MATTER OF L-E-A- DECISION & THE RECOGNITION OF THE
COGNIZABILITY OF THE NUCLEAR FAMILY
The BIA issued the Matter of L-E-A- decision in 2017, which recognized
L-E-A-’s nuclear family claim.110 The decision was often cited when
practitioners represented asylum applicants who also had a family-based claim.
A. Facts of the Case
The Respondent, referred to by his initials, L-E-A-, entered the United
States without inspection in 1998.111 In May 2011, he voluntarily departed
after being placed in removal proceedings by DHS due to an arrest for
driving under the influence.112 Upon returning to Mexico, L-E-A- lived with
his parents in Mexico City and helped run his father’s neighborhood general
store.113 His father had refused to sell drugs out of his store for La Familia
Michoacana, a Mexican drug cartel.114 About a week after returning to
Mexico City, L-E-A- heard gun shots while walking in the street and
dropped to the ground.115 He was not injured and was unsure if the shots
were targeted at him or elsewhere.116 He did note, however, that the shots
were coming from a black sport utility vehicle.117
A week later, he saw the same black sport utility vehicle and four armed
cartel members, who identified themselves as La Familia Michoacana; they
asked L-E-A- if he would sell the cartel’s drugs out of his father’s store.118
When L-E-A- refused, the cartel threatened him and told him to
reconsider.119 Shortly after this incident, four masked cartel members in the
same black sport utility vehicle tried to kidnap L-E-A-, but he successfully
escaped.120 Upon arriving in the United States, he was apprehended and
sought asylum as a defense at his removal hearing.121 He asserted that he
was persecuted by a criminal gang due to his membership in the group
consisting of the “‘immediate family of his father,’ who owned a store
targeted by a local drug cartel.”122 The immigration judge denied relief to
L-E-A-, holding “that the respondent had not shown he was the victim of
anything more than criminal activity.”123
110

Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42–43 (B.I.A. 2017).
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B. The Board’s 2017 Decision
L-E-A- appealed the decision, and, on appeal, the Board of Immigration
Appeals found that L-E-A-’s proposed particular social group of the
immediate family of his father was a cognizable particular social group.124
DHS had not contested the cognizability of L-E-A-’s PSG in its briefing.125
The Board reviewed the longstanding recognition of family ties as a shared
characteristic for a particular social group but explained that “[n]ot all social
groups that involve family members meet the requirements of particularity
and social distinction.”126 The Board wrote: “In consideration of the facts of
this case and the agreement of the parties, we have no difficulty identifying
the respondent, a son residing in his father’s home, as being a member of the
particular social group comprised of his father’s immediate family.”127
The Board approved the social group but denied the Respondent’s
asylum application because of the absence of the necessary nexus between
his membership in his family group and the persecution.128 The Board held
that the cartel could have targeted L-E-A- because of his access to the store
and not because he was the immediate family of his father who owned the
store.129 While L-E-A-’s claim ultimately failed due to nexus reasons, his
case legitimized nuclear family particular social groups.
Acting Attorney General Whitaker directed the Board of Immigration
Appeals to refer the decision for his review in December 2018, which stayed
the proceedings.130 In the meantime, Attorney General Barr took office and
was the one to actually review the decision.131
C. The Attorney General’s 2019 Decision
In his decision, Barr upended the longstanding precedent on particular
social groups in holding that most groups based on membership in nuclear
families could not meet the social distinction requirement of a particular
social group. Before Matter of L-E-A- was referred for attorney general
review, no party had contested the cognizability of L-E-A-’s family-based
PSG.132 Once the case was before Attorney General Barr, however, he wrote
that “[a]ll particular social groups must satisfy the criteria set forth in Matter
of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, and a proposed family-based group is
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no different. An applicant must establish that his specific family group is
defined with sufficient particularity and is socially distinct in his society.”133
Attorney General Barr’s addition of the word “specific” changed
everything. To support his proposition, he cited to Matter of A-B-,134 writing,
“The fact that ‘nuclear families’ or some other widely recognized family unit
generally carry societal importance says nothing about whether a specific
nuclear family would be ‘recognizable by society at large.’”135 In looking to
Matter of A-B- for support, the Attorney General swapped the word
“classes” in Matter of A-B-’s original phrasing for the word “specific.”136
The original language in Matter of A-B- read: “But the key thread running
through the particular social group framework is that social groups must be
classes recognizable by society at large.”137 This marked a significant and
unsupported change.
Attorney General Barr wrote that nearly every person belongs to a
family in a society where families as a concept are significant.138 He sought
to limit the number of cognizable particular social groups by stating that a
shared characteristic most people have—kinship ties—failed the particular
social group requirements. As Attorney General Barr himself recognized in
his opinion, the new requirement of a specific family being socially distinct
will mean that most families will not pass the requirements to constitute a
particular social group.139 He explained that the ordinary family “will not
have the kind of identifying characteristics that render the family socially
distinct within the society in question.”140 He goes on to explain that “[t]he
average family—even if it would otherwise satisfy the immutability and
particularity requirements—is unlikely to be so recognized.”141 His decision
means that only families that are famous, such as the Kardashian family,
would be adequately socially distinct.142
VI. IMPACT & RELEVANCE OF THE DECISION
Some practitioners and scholars have emphasized that the Attorney
General’s holding is narrow—simply, that the Board must conduct a more
133

Id. at 586 (emphasis added).
Id. at 594 (citing Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 336 (Att’y Gen. 2018)). In Matter of AB-, former Attorney General Sessions stated, “Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence
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thorough analysis of particular social group claims even when DHS does not
contest the proposed group.143 These commenters further argue that the more
concerning statements—those predicting that most family-based particular
social groups will fail to meet the particular social group requirements—are
merely dicta.144 As such, these commenters contend that Barr’s opinion is
not groundbreaking because dicta is not legally binding on courts.
While technically Barr’s statements on most families failing the social
distinction requirements may be classified as dicta, evidently, the Attorney
General sought to drastically change particular social group theory. Agency
dicta is powerful because agency “dicta can represent an articulation of its
policy, to which it must adhere or adequately explain deviations.”145 The
Attorney Generals’ agenda, commenced by Whitaker and executed by Barr,
is plainly illustrated by the fact that the family-based particular social group
was not an issue in L-E-A-’s case before it was referred for review by the
Attorney General.
This decision will change the course of asylum law for years to come.
The decision will impact hundreds of thousands of claims, especially the
cases of unaccompanied minors because unaccompanied minors often
present family-based claims.146 This, at its core, constitutes yet another
attack on immigrant families. While this attack through the Matter of
L-E-A-decision has received far less media attention than some other attacks
on immigrant families, like family separation at the border,147 the Matter of
L-E-A- decision is perhaps even more impactful to immigrant families in the
long run.
With one decision, thirty-five years of case law—precedent that upheld
most family-based claims as a quintessential particular social group—was
eviscerated. This abrupt change to asylum law, especially given the
misinterpretation of caselaw and misquoted caselaw, undermines the
stability of this area of law. This lack of stability is especially problematic
given attorney general turnover and the inevitability of different policy goals
and leadership styles. Regardless of the frequency with which an attorney
general refers cases to himself, if the Executive Branch is using its legitimate

143
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regulatory power, the Judicial Branch must balance that power by using its
own legitimate power of judicial review in the form of the Chevron doctrine.
VII. NECESSARY CIRCUIT COURT REACTIONS
A. Motivating Factors
In the interest of justice, the balance of powers, and the stability of
asylum law, circuit courts must use their power to directly challenge
Attorney General Barr’s decision in Matter of L-E-A-. While it may be
possible to side-step the decision,148 a direct challenge is necessary and
achievable under the Chevron doctrine.149 As Justice Kennedy warned,
courts must not abdicate their authority to conduct judicial review,150 and
robust analysis is necessary. The Judicial Branch has long prided itself for
the role it plays in judicial review, reasoning as the Supreme Court did in
1803, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of
necessity expound and interpret that rule.”151
Despite extensive existing circuit court case law on the validity of
family-based particular social groups, Brand X requires courts to conduct a
review under Chevron, even when, like here, agency decisions are
inconsistent.152 Now that the Board has changed its precedent with the
amendments made in Matter of L-E-A-, courts can review the Board’s
amended interpretation of the INA. Courts should find the Matter of
L-E-A-decision to be arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the statute.
B. Analyzing Matter of L-E-A- Under the First Step of Chevron
Congressional intent surrounding the exact interpretation of particular
social group is unclear. What is clear is that Congress defined the term
“refugee” in the Refugee Act of 1980 to comply with its international
obligations under the UN Protocol.153 While the United Nations did not
explicitly define the term either, the Convention’s history shows that the
particular social group ground was meant to be relatively undefined so it

148
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would be malleable enough to protect groups in similar situations to the
other four grounds.154
Looking at how other countries have adopted the United Nations
Protocol into their domestic law has been a helpful statutory construction
tool for the Board, even though international interpretation is not binding on
the United States.155 The Board also recognizes that while not controlling,
UN publications may provide useful interpretive guidance.156 The United
Nations Guidelines define a particular social group as:
a group of persons who share a common characteristic other
than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a
group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is
innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to
identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.157
In Matter of Acosta, the BIA executed its duty of defining the term
“particular social group” domestically by using the tool of statutory
construction; the Board applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis and
concluded that PSG should be interpreted like the other four protected
grounds: race, religion, nationality, and political opinion.158 But since
Congress was silent regarding its intent for the definition of PSG, and the
use of statutory construction tools do not resolve the ambiguity, the BIA has
authority to interpret the meaning of PSG.
C. Analyzing Matter of L-E-A- Under the Second Step of Chevron
Since the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the meaning of
“particular social group,” then the question for the court is whether the
Attorney General’s latest decision on particular social group theory in Matter
of L-E-A- is based on a permissible interpretation of the statute. Because
Matter of L-E-A- is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the statute, courts
must reject its interpretation of PSG as it applies to nuclear families. While
not common, it is certainly not impossible for a court to overcome the second
step of Chevron; one study found that of 817 agency statutory interpretations
that advanced to step two, the agency lost in fifty-one of them.159 Interestingly,
the most common subject area for an agency to lose was immigration, with
nineteen agency interpretations, or 37.3% of the total interpretations, held to
be arbitrary and capricious under the second step of Chevron.160
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Attorney General Barr disingenuously claims to be anchoring his
decision on established precedent. In reality, by omitting the word “classes”
from the original wording in Matter of A-B- and replacing it with “specific,”
Barr changes the law and departs from nearly thirty-five years of caselaw
precedent since Matter of Acosta.161 A class is a collection of individuals
that share a common attribute.162 The BIA itself has stated that family-based
particular social groups are a natural fit within particular social group theory,
doing so not just in Matter of Acosta, but in numerous decisions following
that landmark case.163 Similarly, for decades, circuit courts have considered
family-based claims valid particular social groups: former immigration
judge Jeffrey Chase has noted that “the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all recognized that family can
constitute a PSG, and all have reiterated that opinion in decisions issued in
2014 or later.”164 For example, the First Circuit explained:
There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group
based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics
than that of the nuclear family. Indeed, quoting the Ninth
Circuit, we recently stated that “‘a prototypical example of a
“particular social group” would consist of the immediate
members of a certain family, the family being a focus of
fundamental affiliational concerns and common interests for
most people.’”165
Against this backdrop, when L-E-A- presented a particular social group
claim based on his immediate family, opposing counsel did not disagree.166
This is unsurprising, given the longstanding acceptance of family-based
PSGs spanning multiple jurisdictions and many decades.
In Matter of L-E-A-, the Attorney General wrote that “the respondent
did not show that anyone, other than perhaps the cartel, viewed the
respondent’s family to be distinct in Mexican society.”167 Where did this
need for individual family distinction come from? The Attorney General
states that the social distinction test must be applied to the specific group
presented by the asylum applicant, such as “immediate family members of
[Named Individual],” and not the type of group, such as a nuclear family.168
161
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Barr’s interpretation is flawed. The very case that introduced the
requirements of social distinction and particularity also reaffirmed that
family ties could serve as a characteristic for a PSG.169 Under the doctrine
of ejusdem generis, PSGs are supposed to be akin to the other four protected
classes.170 “Thus when the requirements for ‘membership in a particular
social group’ are consistent with the other grounds of persecution, the
overall burdens are equivalent to those placed on applicants asserting claims
based on the other grounds.”171 The Refugee Act allows an asylum applicant
to name a protected class, so long as it fits the three requirements that will
make it like the other protected classes.172 Naming a protected class as a PSG
will often be broad; a nuclear family as a general concept is broad, just like
religion as a general concept is broad. This is not to be confused with the
applicant’s burden to explicitly state he is applying as the immediate family
member of a named individual. In a society where the nuclear family is an
important grouping, if society members were told that the asylum applicant
lives with his spouse and children, the society members would immediately
recognize it as a group: the nuclear family.173 There is no need for society
members to personally know or recognize the name of the asylum applicant.
Finally, we can consider a proof by contradiction. Assuming that social
distinction is a requirement for the specific group that an individual belongs
to, then an individual persecuted for their membership in a small religious
cult, unknown to society at large, would not be eligible for asylum. We
know, however, that religion as a general concept is a protected class;
therefore, social distinction cannot be a requirement for specific subgroups
within a protected class.
To support his argument, the Attorney General stated that since every
person has a family, the particular social group net is cast wider than
Congress intended.174 The Attorney General did not consider the fact that
Congress approved of other protected classes that are defined by
characteristics that every person holds, such as race. Every person has a race,
and most people also have a nationality, a religion, and a political opinion,175
and yet the validity of these claims are never questioned. It is unclear, then,
why the fact that most people have families has any bearing on the validity
of a particular social group.
Attorney General Barr took the basic guidelines that were supposed to
apply to protected classes generally and replaced them with a hyper-concern
169
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for individual examples of protected classes. Before Matter of L-E-A-, an
asylum applicant had to show that his shared family ties with his proposed
nuclear family group were immutable, socially distinct, and particular as a
general matter in his country. He then had to show nexus by connecting the
specific harm he suffered, or fears to suffer, to his membership in his specific
family, in addition to all the other requirements. After Matter of L-E-A-, an
asylum applicant must show that his specific family is immutable, socially
distinct, and particular, and still show the nexus between the specific harm
he suffered and his specific family. Barr essentially requires a family to be
famous to meet the social distinction requirement.
Perhaps Barr’s goal was to emphasize the need to not take certain
groups, like the nuclear family, for granted as per se valid particular social
groups. Barr wrote that “[t]he Board here did not perform the required
fact-based inquiry to determine whether the respondent had satisfied his
burden of establishing the existence of a particular social group within the
legal requirements of the statute.”176 Yet if this were merely the Attorney
General’s aim, he could have remanded on this fact alone, instead of
disrupting decades of Board and court precedent.
The Attorney General did not elaborate on his new requirement and in
doing so created more confusion. He did not explain the size or scope of the
community wherein the family in question must be socially distinct.
Communities can range from a small, local village to an entire country.
Social distinction requirements of specific families would likely be met
more easily if specific families only needed to be distinct within their local
communities. Further, Barr provided no guidance on how to gauge how
socially distinct a family must be in a given community. If 30% of a
population knows of a family, is that enough? How can immigration judges
even determine how much of a given population knows of a family without
extensive polling? Can a family be well-known through politics, through
entertainment, through wealth? Rather than provide direction for courts,
Attorney General Barr has all but assured that courts implementing his
decision will produce a hodgepodge of inconsistent rulings. Given the
decision’s cryptic guidance and faulty reasoning, courts have no choice but
to reject this opinion as arbitrary and capricious.
The Attorney General’s conclusions in Matter of L-E-A- on
Congressional intent for particular social group theory are misguided. Barr
wrote, “[i]f Congress intended for refugee status to turn on one’s suffering
of persecution ‘on account of’ family membership, Congress would have
included family identity as one of the expressly enumerated covered grounds
for persecution.”177 This statement is dismaying for multiple reasons. As
previously discussed, Congress adopted the United Nation’s Protocol and
176
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passed the Immigration and Nationality Act to comply with the Protocol.178
Particular social group was intentionally drafted broadly to encompass
people who were not initially considered at the United Nations Convention.
Despite congressional intent’s material importance in statutory
interpretation, the Attorney General wrote without acknowledging the
history of the Act.
The Attorney General’s decision in Matter of L-E-A- fails the second
step of Chevron and courts should not defer to the agency decision. Courts
should find Matter of L-E-A- arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the statute
due to the faulty logic in the decision.
CONCLUSION
Matter of L-E-A- has negatively, swiftly, and irrationally changed
asylum law in a drastic manner. Courts should use their judicial review
power to highlight the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the ruling. Despite
changing leaders in the Executive Branch, asylum law must stay true to the
Immigration and Nationality Act. Courts should determine that Matter of
L-E-A- does not merit deference. In the meantime, thousands of
family-based asylum applicants will suffer, marking yet another attack by
the United States Government on the immigrant family.
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